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Introduction
The WEP (Wired Equivalent Privacy) is a part of IEEE 802.11 standard [14] designed for protecting over-the-air communication. While almost all of the WLAN (Wireless LAN) cards and the APs (Access Points) support WEP, a serious key recovery attack (aka FMS attack) was identified by Fluhrer et al. [8] . The attack was then extended and implemented in [1]- [5] , [17] . The FMS attack can basically be prevented * by skipping certain IVs (Initial Values) called weak IVs, but a naive way of skip causes another serious problem. Most of the weak IVs depend on the WEP key and skipping them as they are reveals information on the WEP key. In order to skip IVs safely, the skip patterns must be chosen carefully. In this paper, we review the attack conditions (6) and (7), whose success probability is the highest 0.05 among ever known conditions to guess one key-byte from one packet. Then we identify their safe skip patterns that do not reveal the information on the WEP key from the skipped patterns. This paper is organized as follows: In Sec. 2, we briefly review WEP, RC4 and the FMS attack on the WEP. In Sec. 3, we see the patterns of weak IVs and the dependency on the WEP key. In Sec. 4, we identify the safe patterns for skipping weak IVs, which do not reveal the information on the WEP key. Finally in Sec. 5, we check with exhaustive search that the identified patterns successfully remove weak IVs.
WEP and Its Key Recovery Attack
In this section, we briefly review WEP and its key recovery attacks. (For details, cf. the specification [14] and the papers [8] , [9] , [17] .)
Data Encapsulation Format in WEP
Full description of WEP is available from [14] . What is needed here is its data encapsulation format, which is given as follows:
IV||{(m||CRC(m)) ⊕ RC4(IV||K )}
where || denotes concatenation of the right and the left data, and ⊕ denotes exclusive-or. A data packet m is encapsulated as follows: first m is concatenated with its 32-bit cyclic redundancy check CRC(m). Then (m||CRC(m)) is exclusive-ored with a pseudo-random sequence denoted by RC4(IV||K ) where RC4() is the RC4 key-stream generator, IV is a 24-bit initial value and K is a symmetric-key. IVs should be unique to each other so that RC4(IV||K ) can be unique even if K is fixed. K is a symmetric-key (called WEP key), which is either shared in advance as a password among authorized members or given by another mechanism, such as 802.1x [15] or WPA-PSK [7] . Let k denote the size of K = (IV||K ) in byte, which is either 8-bytes (64-bits) or 16-bytes (128-bits) * * . In this paper, we assume k = 16.
Description of RC4
RC4 is a word oriented stream cipher. Its word size is defined by n and through out this paper we assume n = 8, i.e. one word is 8-bits, which is the most popular setting in RC4 including the case of WEP. RC4 consists of two algorithms: KSA (KeyScheduling Algorithm) and PRGA (Pseudo-Random Generation Algorithm). Their algorithms are shown in Fig. 1 Input: a buffer S of 2 8 bytes and an output size s Output: a sequence Z j := 0 and then shuffles its inner buffer S of 2 8 bytes according to K. The PRGA accepts the shuffled S and then generates a pseudo-random sequence while shuffling S again.
The security of RC4 has been studied by a lot of researchers [11] . While some unwanted properties have been identified, such as the distinguishability from a real random stream, no critical vulnerability has been identified yet on the typical usage of RC4. RC4 in WEP is, however, out of the typical usage (since it opens a part of the RC4 key to the public as an IV) and this exposes the rest of the RC4 key (the WEP key K ) to the risk of recovery [8] .
Key Recovery Attack on WEP
In this subsection, we briefly review the key recovery attack identified by Fluhrer et al. (cf. [8] , [9] , [17] for details). It uses the correlation between certain positions of the WEP key and the first output byte of the PRGA. The correlation becomes higher than the average for certain IVs (called weak IVs). Thus by collecting a lot of pairs of such weak IVs and the corresponding first output bytes, the WEP key can be recovered. We explain why certain
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In practice, some variants exist on the implementation of the key-recovery attack. We categorize them as follows:
Basic variant: uses the IVs that lead to both (3) and (5) .
We call such IVs key-independent weak IVs (since they are independent of the WEP key). FMS: uses not only the key-independent weak IVs but also key-dependent weak IVs.
2 ≤ t are known or guessed, the condition for guess-
where the condition for the Basic variant corresponds to t = 2. Skipping only the key-independent weak IVs is not enough to prevent this attack since even if
are unknown, this attack still works by exhaustively searching
. This is known as the guessing-early-key-bytes approach [17] . Other approaches are also proposed in [12] , [13] . The former relaxes the condition so that more IVs can be used in the attack, but this reduces the success probability and makes it difficult to recover the WEP key in practice [13] . The latter guesses the first output byte from the 257-th output byte. While this might be effective when the fist up to 256 bytes are thrown as suggested in [6] , it does not improve the attacks on WEP since in WEP the first output byte is already known. (In this paper, we focus on countermeasures that are fully compatible with existing WEPs.) (6) and (7) for any t and t = 2. Korek: uses new conditions identified by Korek. To the best of our knowledge, Korek's result has not been published in a paper but appeared only in the source codes of [1], [2] , [5] . Some conditions of this attack are, however, not stable and further analysis is needed.
In this paper, we focus on the FMS attack, especially on the guessing-early-key-bytes approach, i.e. the combination of IVs and WEP keys meeting both (6) and (7) . And also for simplicity, we abbreviate "a ≡ b mod 2 8 " to "a = b" from now on. 
Patterns of Weak IVs in The FMS Attack
In this section, we see the IVs meeting both (6) and (7) and show the dependency on the WEP key. Fig. 3 shows those for t = 2. In Fig. 3 to 7 , weak IVs exist in the space where small cubes are drawn. No cube means no such IV there. (Precisely, in these figures, we split the IV space into 32 3 sub-spaces corresponding to 8 3 IVs and draw one cube there if the sub-space has at least one IV meeting both (6) and (7) to make the figures easier to see.) The weak IVs for t = 2 are independent of WEP keys and can be obtained with exhaustive search of (
On the other hand, weak IVs for t ≥ 3 depend on the WEP key. We show them for t = 3 and K[3] = 86, 170, 254 and 255 in Fig. 4 and hence a naive strategy that skips IVs meeting both (6) and (7) reveals the information on the WEP key. So as not to reveal it, the IVs to skip must be designed to be independent of the WEP key while covering almost all of the key-dependent weak IVs.
To do this, we have to grasp the patterns of IVs and 
WEP keys to be weak first. One method is to try all the combinations of IVs and WEP keys and then check whether they satisfy both (6) and (7). This approach is, however, computationally infeasible for large t . Hence we analyze the weak IV patterns obtained theoretically in [10] . We show them in Table 1 where u is any integer meeting 0 ≤ u ≤ t < t ≤ 15 except u = 1 † . K[]'s meeting both columns for "First constraint on K[]" and "Second constraint on K[]" in any row can be used to guess K[t] as long as the column for "Relationship among u, t − u and t " is satisfied in addition to the universal constraints 0 ≤ u ≤ t < t ≤ 15 except u = 1.
Safe Skip Patterns For Immunizing WEP Against
The FMS Attack
In this section, we identify the patterns of IVs to skip that cover almost all of the weak IVs and that do not reveal information of the WEP key from the skipped patterns. Such patterns (we call them safe skip patterns) can be obtained by the union of the key-independent weak IVs and the keydependent weak IVs for all the WEP keys. This strategy, however, does not work since all the IV space is covered by the key-dependent weak IVs. Therefore in Section 4.1 we try to remove WEP keys whose key-dependent weak IVs cover all the IV space. Then in Section 4.2 we identify the patterns of IVs to remove the rest weak IVs.
WEP Keys to Avoid
In this subsection, we identify the WEP keys whose keydependent weak IVs cover all the IV space and then obtain the patterns of WEP keys to avoid to remove such catas- † When u = 1, t = 2, i.e. one can guess IV [2] but this is meaningless since IV [2] is known to the public.
trophic weak IVs. The catastrophic patterns can be identified by looking for the rows in Table 1 KF for u ≥ 3:
KK for u ≥ 3:
KE for t − u ≥ 3:
Fortunately, the third items in each type depend only on the WEP key and can be removed by avoiding WEP keys meeting any of (8), (9) and (10) 
for 3 ≤ u ≤ 7 and 2u < t (8)
where the constraints 2u < t in both (8) and (9), and t−u < u in (10) come from the first items in each type above, the constraint u ≤ 7 in (8) and (9) is obtained from t ≤ 15 and 2u < t, and then the constraint u ≤ 12 in (10) comes from t ≤ 15 and 3 ≤ t − u. Furthermore, (8) to (10) can be rewritten as (11) by substituting i s and i e † for u + 1 and t − u respectively in both (8) and (9), and by substituting i s and i e for t − u + 1 and u respectively in (10) .
11) † Subscripts "s" and "e" in is and ie stand for "start" and "end," respectively. (11), respectively. The 14-th to 20-th lines are for checking the conditions and then printing out the result.
For reference, we list up all the combinations of K [4] , K [5] and K [6] meeting (11) below † † :
We show the number of K[i]'s to avoid in Table 2 . If all of them are avoided, the probability of a randomly chosen WEP key being accepted is (256 − 3)
2 · (256 − 12) 2 · (256 − 15)/256 9 = 0.742 and that after x weak bytes are replaced is lower bounded by P r(x) = I.e., even if a given WEP key is not accepted, by replacing at most three weak key bytes, it will be accepted with probability more than 0.999. The number of remaining WEP keys after (11) is avoided is 256
2 · (256 − 15) = 2 103.57 , which is smaller than the original number 2 104 but still large enough to prevent exhaustive search.
In Table 3 , we summarize the patterns of WEP keys to avoid, the remaining WEP key space and the ratio of it to the original space (as well as those for IVs that will be obtained in the next subsection).
IVs to Skip
As explained in the previous subsection, KF for 3 ≤ u, KK for 3 ≤ u and KE for 3 ≤ t−u in Table 1 can be removed by avoiding WEP keys meeting (11) . Therefore the remaining weak IV types we have to remove are KF for u = 2, KK for u = 2, KE for t − u = 2, FF, FK and FE. Each type can be removed by skipping the following IVs † † : 
Keys or Table 4 The number of IVs meeting both (6) and (7) (23) 
where 3 ≤ t ≤ 15.
FF for 1 < u:
where 2 ≤ u ≤ 14 since 1 < u and u ≤ t < t ≤ 15, i.e. u < 15.
FK:
where 2 ≤ u ≤ 7 since u < t−u and t ≤ 15, i.e. u < 15/2, and then 1 < u and t − u ≤ t , i.e. max(2, min(t − t )) = max(2, 1) = 2 ≤ u.
KF for u = 2:
where 5 ≤ t ≤ 15 since u < t − u, u = 2 and t ≤ 15.
KK for u = 2:
FE:
where 1 ≤ t − u ≤ 13 since t ≤ 15 and 1 < u, i.e. t − u ≤ max(t) − min(u) = 15 − 2 = 13, and then u < t, i.e. 0 < t − u.
KE for t − u = 2:
By removing the overlap among (12) to (18), they can be expressed as follows:
To make the skip rule simpler and also to skip some minor weak IVs [10] that are not covered by Table 1 , we recommend to skip IVs meeting any of (23) and (24). We show the ability of them in Section 5.
After skipping (23) and (24), the remaining IV space is 23.83 bits (or 89.0% of the original 24 bit IV space), which might be small but still far larger than the space where WEP keys are replaced frequently, say every after 10,000 packets as suggested in [17] , which corresponds to only 0.06% of the original IV space.
In Table 3 , we summarize the patterns of IVs to skip, the remaining IV space and the ratio of it to the original space as well as those for WEP keys.
Count of Weak IVs
In this section, we exactly count the number of weak IVs meeting both (6) and (7) with exhaustive search of all the combinations of IVs and some early bytes of the WEP keys. Table 4 shows the case for t = 2, i.e. the case where adversaries do not know the WEP key. As you can see, all the weak IVs are removed by skipping IVs meeting any of (23) and (24). Fig. 9 shows the case for t = 3, i.e. the case where adversaries know K[3] or assume K[3] to be a certain value. As shown in Fig. 9 [10] ). By skipping IVs meeting any of (23) and (24), all the weak IVs in Fig. 9 are removed completely. Fig. 10 and 11 show the cases for t = 4, i.e. adversaries know both K[3] and K [4] or assume all or some of them to be certain values. 9 The number of IVs meeting both (6) and (7) to guess K[t] for t = 3. After skipping IVs meeting any of (23) and (24), all of them were removed. K [7] . As explained in Sect. 4.1, they must be removed by avoiding WEP keys meeting (11) .
In the same way, we confirmed that all the weak IVs for the other K[3]'s in t = 4 can be removed by skipping IVs meeting any of (23) and (24) and then avoiding WEP keys meeting (11) . These results ensure that adversaries cannot use (6) and (7) even if they perform exhaustiv search for K [3] and K [4] .
Conclusion
We investigated the patterns of IVs and WEP keys known to be weak using both (6) and (7). We identified safe skip patterns that cover them and that do not reveal information on the WEP key. Basically, such safe skip patterns can be obtained by the union of the key-independent weak IVs and the key-dependent weak IVs for all the WEP keys. Unfortunately, this strategy does not work since the union of them covers all the IV space. Therefore we firstly identified the WEP keys whose key-dependent weak IVs cover all the IV space. They are the WEP keys meeting any of (11) . By avoiding them, weak IVs are distributed locally. We identified the patterns of IVs covering them. They are the IVs meeting any of (23) and (24).
The remaining WEP key space after avoiding (11) is 103.57 bits (or 74.2% of the original 104 bit space), which is large enough to prevent exhaustive-search. And then the remaining IV space after skipping (23) and (24) is 23.83 bits (or 89.0% of the original 24 bit IV space), which might be small but still far larger than the space where WEP keys are replaced frequently, say every after 10,000 packets as suggested in [17] , which corresponds to only 0.06% of the original IV space.
To obtain safe skip patterns for the other attacks on WEP would be our further study. 
